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Summary 
The issue of the vertical/or horizontal operation of the Bill of Rights 
(chapter 3) is a controversial one. The interim constitution deals with 
this controversy in a subtle way by avoiding direct horizontal operation 
of Chapter 3. Instead, it provides for the so-called 'seepage to hori-
zontal relationships' in terms of section3!{3). This apparently was a political 
compromise between the pro-vertical only and the pro-horizontal groups. 
The human rights history of this country justifies a Bill of Rights that 
would have both vertical and horizontal operation. However, in section 
35 (3) there is potential for the values enshrined in the constitution 
and Chapter 3, and the spirit hereof, to permeate and filter through 
the entire legal system in all it's applications. It would seem, however, 
as demonstrated by the decisio~ in De Klerk v Du Plessis, that the extent 
to which this filtering process will benefit individuals in their private 
relations, will depend on the interpretation given to section 35 (3) by the 
courts. If courts>as it"'happend in De Klerk's case tail to realise the full 
import of section 35 ( 3) aspects ·bf the existing law which are unjust could re-
main and the process of creating a just, open and democratic society will be 
hampered. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 200 of 1993 marks the end of a 
repressive and unjust legal system and the inception of a legal order based 
on justice. 
This constitution representsa moral consesus among all South Africans. Through 
it South Africans have identified the values they share. And it is these 
values which must guide the creation of a new society. 
In terms of Section 4 (1) this constitution is the supreme law of the land. 
It lays the foundation for a new legal order. It forms a broad normative 
framework for the legiiirnate exercise of governmental power in all its forms. 
It establishes an independent judiciary which will undertake the important 
task of transforming South African society by ensuring that the values en-
shrined in the constitution are vigorously enforced and defSllded against the 
acts of governmental majorities. 
The judiciary, particularly the Constitutional Court, is to act as a sentinel 
for the constitution. The legal order of the past emasculated the judiciary 
and rendered it powerless in the face of terrible human rights violations 
by the then governments. This was the era of parliamentary sovereingty. The 
dictum in the case of Sachsv Minister of Justice 1934 AD 11 bears testimony 
to this fact. At p37 the court said: 'Parliament may make any encroachment 
it chooses upon the life, liberty or property of any individual subject to 
its sway, and ••• it is the function of the courts of law to enforce its 
will'. 
• 
South African law reports are full of dicta such as this. The English heritage 
of South African.Constitutional law was identified as the source of this posi-
tivistic approach to statutory interpretation. This English influence over 
South African schooled judges, ill-equipped them for judicial service in a 
system of Constitutional Supremacy. Proof of this is the performance of 
former South African judges in the courts of the then independent homelands 
of Bophuthatswana and Ciskei which had supreme Constitu~ions. 
In the words of I.Southwood 'Naught for your (constitutional) comfort: 
Monnakale v Republic of Bophuthatswana' (1992) SA PR/PL 169 at p171 these 
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judges could not 'make the leap from a system of parliamentary supremacy to 
one of Constitutional Supremacy'. Testimony of this failure to make the 
'leap' is found in, e.g., the dictum by Friedman Jin the case of Monnakale 
v Republic of BophuthatswanQ1991 (1) SA 598 (BGD). At p621 he said: 'An 
analysis of the authorities I have cited yields a distillation to the effect 
that the role of the judiciary is to interpret the enactments of parliament, 
and where the meaning of the enactment is plain and unambiguous, effect must 
be given thereto, however unpalatable the result might be. It is not for the 
court to indulge in an exercise of semantic elasticity in the face of clear 
language nor can it disregard the well-established and proven canons of cons-
truction and interpretation at the slightest seductive beckoning of what the 
law ought or should be' (my emphasis). 
The court here was concerned with the interpretation of the Bophuthatswana 
Constitution Act 18 of 1977 which is supreme constitution. I.Southwood 
(supra) criticises the judge's approach to constitutional interpretation in 
this case. The judge demonstrated his loyalty to his roots by referring, 
as authority for his decision, to South African and English decisions, coun-
tries which had and have parliamentary supremacy, as apposed to Constitutional 
Supremacy. 
In the former Ciskei, Pickard C.J., in the case of Bongopi v Chairman of the 
Council state, Ciskei and others 1992 (3) SA 250 (CKGD) at p265 said: 
'This court has always stated openly that it is-not the maker of laws. It 
will enforce the law as it finds it. To attempt to promote policies that 
are not to be found in the law itself or to prescribe what it believes to be the 
correct public atti~udes or standards in regard to those policies is not 
its function'. 
Fortunately the drafters of the South African Constitution Act 200 of 1993 
deemed it necessary to expressly give guidance to the courts as to how they 
are to embark on the new task of interpretating the new Constitution. This 
is provided for in Section 35. 
However, even before the enactment of the Constitution Act there were 
positive signals, from some judges in the former Bophuthatswana and Ciskei, 
that the 'leap' form operating in a system of parliamentary supremacy to one 
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of Constitutional Supremacy is not impossible to make. This is evident 
in the decisions of Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana 1992 (4) SA 
540 (BGD) and the appeal case in the case of Bongopi (supra) reported at 
1993 (3) SA 494 (CKAD). 
The decision in De Klerk v Du Plessis (supra) is among the first cases 
dealing with the interpretation of the Constitution (Act 200 of 1993). As 
this and other decisions of the South African courts indicates, the approach 
adopted by the courts to interpret the Constitution willdetermine the extent 
to which South Africans will benefit from the entrenchment of the fundamental 
rights in Chapter 3 of the Constitution. A literal or positivistic approach 
to interpretating the Constitution, as it is shown below, will definitely 
deny South Africans the opportunity to fully enjoy these rights. On the 
other hand a purposive or teleological approach to-interpreting the Consti-
tution will avail to south Africans th~ opportunity .of :fully enjoying these 
rights. The decision is De Klerk's case (supra) will be considered and 
analysed in this context. 
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Chapter 1 
Section 35: Section 35 guides the courts through the process of Constitutional 
interpretation. It prescribes an approach to interpretation that will give 
expression to the values enshrined in the Constitution and Chapter 3 in parti-
cular. Only an approach which recognises the purposes, goals or aspirations 
behind the language of the Constitution can fully give expression to these 
values. 
a) Section 35 (1): Section 35 (1) provides as follows: 'In interpreting 
the provisionsof this chapter a court of law shallpromote values which 
underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality 
and shall where applicable have regard to public international law 
applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter 
and may have regard to comparable foreign case law'. 
i) This section is only meant for the interpretation of th eprovisions of 
Chapter 3. Chapter 3 (the Bill of Rights) entrenches certain rights. 
These rights have been chosen for entrenchment because of their fundamen-
tal nature. They constitute the minimum condition for the establishment 
of a society desired and cherished by South Africans, i.e., an open 
democratic society based on freedom and equalit'J. 
ii) The courts are enjoined, in the interpretation of the provisions of Chapter 
3, to promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society 
based on freedom and equality. A court faced with an issue requiring the 
interpretation of the provisions of Chapter 3 or the interpretation of the 
nature, purpose, cdntent or scope of a right entrenched in terms of this 
Chapter, has to promote these values. 
This logically requires the court to first discover these values. I~ 
,f<IQl.J 
other words a court~with an issue requiring the interpretation of, 
e.g., section 15, which entrenches freedom of expression, has to place 
this freedom in the context of an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality. In giving meaning to the provision of this section 
it has to bear in mind these values. Therefore an interpretation which 
unreasonably restricts the scope and context of this freedom cannot in the 
end contribute to the promotion of these values. 
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The court in S v Ma-.kwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (cc) had to 
decide on the constitutionality of th death penalty. In the process it 
was required to interpret the relevant provisions of Chapter 3 being 
Section 9 (the right to life), section 10 (the right to respect for and 
protection of dignity) section 11 (2) (the right not to be subjected to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment). The court had therefore, to place, e.g., 
the right to life and to human dignity, in the context of an open and 
democratic society based on freedom andequa~ity. In identifying the under-
lying values, in this regard, it came upon the concept of Ubuntu. 
At p500 - 501 Mokgoro J identifies the value of Ubuntu as becoming a 
shared one among South Africans of all races. She defines Ubuntu at 
p501D as meaning 'humaness, personhood and morality'; also as enveloping 
'···the key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, 
conformity to basic norms and collective unity .•• '. She continues at 
p501E - F to say 'Its spirit emphasises respect for human dignity,marking 
a shift from confrontation to conciliation. In South Africa U buntu has 
become a notion with particular resonance in the building of democracy. 
It is part of our rainbow heritage, though it might have operated and still 
operates differently in diverse community settings. In the Western cultural 
heritage, respect and value for life, manifested i~ the all-embracing con-
cepts of 'humanity' and menswaardigheid' are also highly priced. It is 
values like these that section 35 requires to be promoted. They give 
meaning and texture to the principles of a society based on freedom and 
equality'. 
The post-emble to th eConstitution Act titled 'National Unity and Reconci-
• 
lliation' identifies the concept of Ubuntu as one of the values South Africans 
should embrace in order to survive the consequences of the past system of 
Apartheid and to lay a good foundation for a new society. 
In this way the court, in Makwanyane's case (supra) arrived at the conclu-
. sion that, the values underlying the rights to life, human dignity and to 
freedom from being subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, 
among which it identified the value of Ubuntu, demand that the death 
penalty should be declared unconstitutional. 
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The value of Ubuntu as described by Mokgoro J in Makwanyane's case 
is all-encompassing, it is omni-present and it characterises all 
humanity irrespective of colour or race. In its widest possible 
meaning it can be found to underlie most, if not all, of the rights 
enshrined in Chapter 3. 
The desire by South Africans to make a new beginning has led to the entren-
chment of this value in the Constitution • And it is the spirit of values 
such as Ubuntu which must permeate the process of giving meaning to the 
rights in Chapter 3. 
iii) Section 35 (1) also provides for South African courts to have regard to 
the rules of public international law with regard to human rights. The 
history of South Africa in the human rights field demands this country 
to learn from other nations. The international nature of human rights 
also demands that nations should learn from one another in order to co-
ordinate the struggle for human rights internationally, with the aim 
being to establish a just and peaceful world for all mankind. Foreign 
case law in the human rights field also has invaluable lessons for 
South African courts. 
b) Section 35 (2): This section provides for the unity of the. legal system. 
In terms of this section where a law which limi~s the rights in Chapter 
3 is reasonably capable of an interpretation which does not exceed such 
limits, such law should be given the latter meaning. The word 'law' 
in this context can be said to include the common law and customary law 
if this section is read together with section 35 (3), 33 (2) and 33 (3). 
The provisions of this and the latter sections are intended to harmonise 
the common law)customary law and statute law with the Constitution and the 
values it enshrines. 
c) Section 35 (3): It provides as follows: 'In the interpretation of any 
law and the application and development of the common law and customary 
law, a court shall have due regard to the spirit, purport and objec+,s of this 
chapter'. 
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Analysis: 
1. This section provides for the interpretation of a law ('any law') and 
the application and development of the common law and customary law. 
The word 'law' in this section clearly refers to statute law. It cannot 
bear the same meaning it does in section 7 (2), since the common law 
and customary law are separately and specifically provided for in this 
section (35(3)). With regard to section 7 (2) most commentators agree, 
e.g., A Cachalia in Cachalia, H. Cheadle, D. Davis et al (1994) 'Funda-
mental rights in the new Constitution'; A. Basson 'Labour Law and the 
Constitution' (1994) THRHR 498 that the word 'law' herein refers to both sta-
tute law, common law and customary law (the legal system as awhole). This 
section provides: 'This chapter (chapter 3) shall apply to all law in force 
and all administrative decisions taken and acts performed during the 
pericd of operation of this constitution'. 
Section 7 (2) is preceded by section 4 (in the light of which it must be 
interpreted). Section 4 is titled 'Supremacy of the Constitution' and pro-
vides(4(1):'This constitution shall be the Supreme law of the Republic 
and any law or act inconsistent with its provisions shall, unless other-
wise provided expressly or by necessary implication in this constitution, 
be of no force and effect to the extent of the inconsistency.' Again the 
word 'law' in section 4 has a wider meaning to include statute law, the com-
mon law and customary law. Section 33 (2) confirms this interpretation. 
However, as stated above in section 35 (3) the word 'law' is used to refer 
to statute law only. 
2. The application and development of the common law and customary law. 
The section further provides for the application and development of the 
Common law and C~stomary Law. In my opinion this application and develop-
ment of the common law necessarily involves interpretation. To 
apply and develop these branches of the law necessarily requires an under-
standing of the concepts and principles contained therein and this process 
has to be preceded logically by interpretation. 
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The provisions of sections 33 (2) and (3) are relevant here. Section 33 (2) 
provides: 'Save as provided for in subsection (1) or any other provision 
of this Constitution, no law, whether a rule of the common law, customary 
law or legislation, shall limit any right entrenched in this chapter'. 
Section 33 ( 3) provides: 'The entrenchment of the rights in terms of this 
chapter shall not be construed as denying the existence of any other rights 
or freedoms recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legis-
lation to the extent that they are not inconsistent with this chapter. 
These sections together (and read with sections 7 (2) and 4 (1)) sanction 
a scrutiny of the common law and customary law (and leg:islation) to ensure 
that they comply with th eprovisions of chapter 3 and this scrutiny 
involves in~erpretation. 
3. Section 35 {3) further enjoins the courts when embarking on the above 
processes, i.e., interpretation of statute law and the application and 
development of the common law and customary law,to '···have due regard 
to the spirit, purport and objects of this chapter' (chapter 3). This 
provision is in line with section 7 (2) and sections 33 (2) and (3)· 
The spirit, purport and objects of chapter 3 have to permeate the 
processes described above. 
A question may be asked as to what is the spirit; purport and objects of 
Chapter 3. To answer this question one logically has to interpret the provi-
sions of Chapter 3. The whole object of Chapter 3, as stated above is to esta-
blish an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality. This objeci 
is deductible from the nature of the rights enshrined in this chapter. The 
spirit of the chapter is that of, the recognition of and respect for the dig-
nity of all South Africans, their equality and freedom, and that of justice 
for all South Africans irrespective of race, gender, sex, e'hbnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientattion, age, disability, religion, conscience, 
belief, culture or language. 
4. The implications and objects of section 35 (3) 
The object of section 35 (3) is to enjoin the courts, when interpreting 
any law and also when applying and developing the common law and custo-
mary law, to have due regard to the spiritJpurport and .objects of chapter 
3. In other words the spirit of the values enshrined in Chapter 3 must be 
made to permeate all these processes. The important question is therefor: 
'what are the implications of the provisions of section 35 (3)?' 
Debate on the meaning and implications of this section has led to the con-
trovesial issue of the vertical/horizontal applicability of Chapter 3 being 
placed in the spotlight. Viewsregarding this issue differ. In tracing the 
origin of this section LM Du Plessis in an article in 'A Background 
to Drafting the Chapter on fundamental Rights' in Birth of a 
Constitution' edited by D de Villiers at p93 says: It was a matter of 
contention whether the provisions of the chapter should be enforceable 
against the state and its organs only or whether they should bind both the 
state and private institutions and persons. In the end it was agreed that 
the chapter should operate vertically only, but that provision be made for 
a seepage to horizontal relationships. As a result a sub-clause was in-
cluded in the interpretation clause requiring any court of law applying and 
developing the existing law to have due regard to the spirit, purport and 
objects of the chapter (section 35 (3)). To allay fears that the predomi-
nantly vertical operation of the chapter can be construed as authorising 
'privatised apartheid', a provision was also included in the limitation 
clause permitting measuers designed to prohibit unfair discrimination by 
(private) bodies and persons not explicitly bound by the chapter(sec 33(4))' • 
• 
Therefore, according to Du Plessis,Section 35 (3) was inserted to provide 
'a seepage to hirizontal relationships'. This is achieved by making chapter 
3 applicable to the common law, which governs horizontal rela~ionships, i.e., 
relations between private persons. 
J.D. van der VY'Jer in 'The private sphere in Constitutional Litigation' 
(1994) 3 THRHR 378 at p 394 gives the example of a contract for the sale 
of a house which precludes other prospective buyers on the basis of race, 
i.e., which limits the sale of the property to buyers of a particular race 
I 
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only. He is of the opinion that even though this contract would, in the 
past, perhaps be invalidated on the basis of its being contra bonos mores, 
the latter concept has now acquired added meaning inspired by the provisions 
of Chapter 3. In his opinion the concept of bones mores is now to be rede-
fined in view of what would be 'justifiable in an open and democratic so-
ciety based on freedom and equality.' 
Martin Brassey in 'Labour Relations under the new South African Constitution' 
South African Labour monograms 5/94, Labour Law unit, University of Cape 
Town at p6, is of the view that: 'The clause mandates a new approach to 
the interpretation, application and development of our law, one that gives 
effect to the aspirations of the chapter (chapter 3)'. In what can be 
said to be a reference to section 35 (2) he continues: 'Behind it there 
doubtless lies a desiretc.save laws from invalidity by sanctioning a 
validating, interpretation af them if.this is competent. But it also seems 
intended to ensure that when laws fall beyond the governance of the chapter, 
they will at least be interpreted, applied and developed in accordance with 
its spirit'. Section 35 (3) is not intended to save prima facie invalid 
laws from invalidity by sanctioning a validating interpretation of them 
if thi3 is competent,~s in11ended .to enjoin the co-.1rts -f.o 
infuse the spirit of chapter 3 into both statute law, common and customary 
law, i.e., into the entire legal system. 
An e~a~~le of this in the law of defamation is given by Annel van Aswagen in 
'The implications of a Bill of Rights for the law of contract and delict' 
(1995) 11 SAJHR 50 • 
• 
She is of the opinion, as regards the law of delict, that since the latter 
is largely based on policy consideratiohs, especially as regards the issue 
of wrongfullness , it is going to be greatly influenced by chapter 3. She 
gives the example of the law of defarmation, which in the pas~ was loaded 
in favour of protecting the dignity or reputation of the individual as 
against freedom of expression. She refers to the decisions in SAUK v 
0' Malley 1977 (3) SA 394 (A) and Pakendorf v De Flemingh 1982 (3) SA 
146 (A) in which the principle of the strict liability of the media 
was introduced into South Africa Law. The basis of this principle is 
that in the opinion o~ the cour~public policy demanded that indivi-
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duals should be protected against impairment of their dignity and re-
putation by the comparatively powerful mass media. 
Further in Neethling v Du Plessis and others, Neethling v The Weekly Mail 
1994 (1) SA 708 (A) the court rejected reliance by the media on a (new) 
defence of public interest not coupled with truth in that '···in our law 
public policy did not require such strong protection of freedom of the press 
(to be) in the public interest'. 
It is accepted that public policy in the past, informed .by the system of 
Apartheid could not have required such strong protection of freedom of the 
press to be in the public interest. It however found strong protection 
of individuals' reputations to be in the-public interest. 
Public policy today however has to be informed by the values enshrined in 
Chapter 3. Freedom of expression is entrenched in Chapter 3. The value of 
this freedom in democracy has been recognised. The courts now have the duty, 
in terms of section 35 (3), to ensure that the Common Law of defamation re-
flects this. 
Van Aswagen (supra) at p62 is also of the opinion that • ••• indirect hori-
zontal application of the provisions of chapter 3 may· reverse this devel-
lopment (i.e., strict liability), restoring the original position in the 
light of the recognition of freedom of the press as a fundamental right.' 
The implications of Section 35 (3), according to these authors are therefore, 
to introduce indirect (as opposed to direct) horizontal operation of Chapter 
3, i.e., the seepage to horizontal relationships referred to by Du Plessis 
(supra~ A.C. Basson (supra) on tne other hand is of the view that the effect 
of sections7 (2), 33 (2), 33 (3) and 35 (3) is that in'··· applying the 
common law, which applies to matters between third parties, the 
courts will thus be obliged to have due regard to the fundamental rights 
and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights and will be able to ensure that 
no infringement of the entrenched fundamental human rights takes place' 
(at p501 - 502). The effect hereof is that according to the author these 
sections bring about the direct (as epposed to indirect) horizontal oper-
ation of Chapter 3. This view in my opinion misconstrues the provisions of 
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section 35 (3) and ignores the provisions of section 33 (4) which clearly 
indicates that private bodies and persons are not bound by the provisions ·Of 
Chapter 3. 
The existing law of defamation as indicated by Van Aswagen surely carinot 
and should not survive the provisions of section 15 (freedom of expression) 
of Chapter 3. Section 35 (3) gives the courts the responsibility and oppor-
tunity to ensure that the values underlying the constitution are infused 
into the entire legal system to accord it with the Constitution. This is the 
way in which it introduces indirect horizontal operation of the rights in 
Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 2 
De Klerk and Another v Du Plessis and others 1994 (6) BCLR 124 (T) 
a) The facts 
Plaintiffs instituted an action for defamation against the defendants being 
the editor, journalist and publisher of the Pretoria News. The action was 
based on allegedly defamatory matter published by derendants. The action 
was instituted before the commencement of the Constitution Act 200 of 1993, 
i.e., before 27 April 1994. After the Constitution came into operation 
the defendants sought to amend their plea to add a defence based on sec-
tion 15 of the Constitution Act (Act 200 of 1993). Section 15 provides 
for freedom of speech and expression as well as freedom of the press and 
other media. 
The effect hereof would be that Section 15 abrogates the common law principle 
of the strict liability of the media, established in the case of SAUK v O' 
Malley (supra), as regards defamation. This would allow the defendants to 
rely on a defence of absence of animus injuriandi. 
In deciding the question whether the application for amendment of the plea 
should be granted, the following issues were thereby also raised for decision 
by the court: 
i) Whether, since the matter was pending beforethe Constitution Act came into 
operation, section 241 (8) precluded restrospective operation of the Consti-
tution Act 200 of 1993. 
ii) Whether the fundamental rights in Chapter 3 of the Constitution Act had only 
vertical operation and not also horizontal operation. 
b) The decision 
The court held: 
i) that according to the authorities binding on it, if an amendment, sought 
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by a defendant, to a plea, would render the plea excipiable, such amend-
ment should not be acceptable. The court found that the amendment sought 
by the defendant would render the ·plea excipiable on the following grounds: 
a) the matter was pending before the commencement of the Constitution Act and 
section 241 (8) precludes retrospective operation of the Constitution Act 
for reasons stated in Kalla v The Master 1995 (1) SA 261 (T). 
b) That the fundamental rights contained in Chapter 3 apply only vertically 
and therefore the defendants' reliance on section 15 in this dispute was 
improper. 
c) The reasons for the decision: 
i) The effect of section 241 (8): As regards the effect or meaning of this 
section the court relied on the decision in Kalla's case (supra). In this 
case the court (also per Van Dijkhorst J)held that-.the ordinary rules of 
interpretation should be applied in interpreting section 241 (8). In applying 
these rules, the court gave the words used in the section their ordinary 
meaning, which meaning it found to be plain. In concluding that section 241 (8) 
precludes the retrospective operation of the Constitution, the court also 
relied upon the presumption against retrospective operation of statutes. 
The matter has since been finally decided by the Constitutional court in 
S v Mhlungu and others 1995 (3) SA 867 (cc) this decision will be considered 
below. 
ii) The question whether Chapter 3 has in addition to vertical operation, hori-
zontal operation: In other words could the defendants in this dispute against 
the plaintiffs rely on the provisions of section 15 or are the rights 
in Chapter 3, e.g. freedom of the press or expression enforceable against 
private persons? In arriving at its decision that the rights in Chapter 
3 are only enforceable against the state (vertical) and not against private 
persons (horizontal), the court gave the following reasons: 
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1) By tradition Bills of Rights are inserted in Constitutionsto curtail 
state power and prevent tyrany by states. They are intended to balance 
the interests of the subject as against those of the state. The regula-
tion of private relations by Bills of Rights is an exception. 
2. Fundamental rights are normally protected against state action only. 
Where there is horizontal protection it is to a limited extent and 
it is stated expressly. The correct approach to the interpretation 
of Chapter 3 is to take the view that the South African Constitution is a 
conventional one unless the contrary is clearly indicated. 
3. 'There was a pressing need for a Bill of Rights given the suppressive 
state action of' the past. The call for a conventional Bill of Rights was 
sharp and clear. But there wer~ no such calls for a Bill of Rights on a 
horizontal plane' (at pl31). 
4. 'The fundamental rights and freedoms now set out in chapter 3 had not been 
curtailed by our common law. In fact they can be found enshrined therein. 
The removal of all authoritarian encroachment leads to their resuscitation'. 
(at pl31). 
5. 'There was no need of the horizontal application of a Bill of Rights. What-
ever corrections should be mad~ from time to time ~ our common law can 
be done by the legislature'. (at pl31 E - F) 
6. Subjecting the whole body of the ,common law to Chapter 3 would result in 
unprecedented legal uncertainty. If it was the intention of the legisla-
ture that his be the case it would have said so expressly. 
7. The provisions of section 33 (4) would be enti~ely redundant if chapter 3 
was indeed intended to bind these bodies and persons. These measures would 
be unnecessary as chapter 3 would have rendered illegal such discrimina-
tory practices by these bodies and persons. 
8) The Common Law adequately provides for the protection of life, e.g., in 
criminal law and even provides for the protection against the impairment 
of dignity and f'ama. The whole body of private law would become unsettled 
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if every act or conduct of individuals inter se was to be subject to the 
Bill of Rights. 
9. Criticizing the decision in Mandela v Falati 1994 (4) BCLR 1 (w) at p132 I 
he said: '··· that political activity occurs at grassroots level and that 
therefore the drafters intended section 21 to have horizontal application, 
disregards the fact that historically political activity was not inhibited by 
the citizenry but by state repression. That is the evil the drafters sought 
-to:· combat ' • 
10. The provisions of sections 33(2) and 33(3) do not make any mention of the 
scope of the rights mentioned, i.e., whether they are vertical or horizontal. 
Section 35(3) also does not widen the scope of the rights to include their 
direct horizontal application. 
11. On the other hand the provisions of Section 33 (4) and 33 (5) 'provide for 
legislative intereference with the legal relationship between citizen and 
citizen in order to apply some of the fundamental norms enacted in the 
Constitution' (at p 133 B - C). 
These reasons are discussed in the Chapter below. 
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Chapter 3 
A critical appraisal of the decision in the light of the Constitution Act and 
section 35 (3) in particular: 
a) The approach to Constitutional interpretation: 
The court in De Klerk's case (supra) before dealing with the issues before it 
also considered what is the proper approach to interpreting a Supreme Constitu-
tion such as the Constitution Act 200 of 1993. 
The court (at pl28 E - F) rejected what is called a 'generous approach' to inter-
pretation and preferred a purposive approach instead. With regard to a generous 
approach it held that this would 'lead to interpretation based on personal pre-
dilections and preferences' (at p128 E). In defining what a purposive approach 
involves, the court, at pl28 G, said: 'In m·y view one must apply the purposive.. 
approach to interpretation of our Constitution, determining from it as a whole 
what was the aim of Chapter 3 and its constituent sections indi~idually, what 
problems and aspirations did it seek to address and what does it have in mind 
for our society. In short what are the values and norms our society cherishes 
and intends to uphold.' 
At pl28 - 129 J - B the court continued to say: 'When interpreting the Consti-
tution and mor& particularly the bill of rights it has to be done against the 
backdrop of our chequered and repressive history in the human rights field. 
The state by legislative and administrative means curtailed the common law human 
rights of most of its citizens in many fields while the courts looked on poWerless. 
Parliament and the executive reigned supreme. It is this malpractice which the 
bill of rights seeks to combat• 
In Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order and Another 1994 (3) SA 625 (EC~) 
Froneman J found similarities be~~een the purposive approach and the common law 
principles of interpretation as set out in Hleka v Johannesburg City Council 
1949 (1) SA 842 (A) at p852 - 3, i.e., the approach to interpretation must 
be: 
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a) ' to ascertain what the position was before the enactment of a statute, 
b) then to identify the 'mischief' which the later statute sought to remedy, 
c) to ascertain the remedy provided by the new provision, 
d) and the reason for the remedy'. In the court's opinion (in Qozeleni's 
case (supra)) 'the only material difference between the common law app-
~Toach and the present (purposive) approach is the recognition that the 
previous constitutional system in this country was the :fundamental mischief 
to be remedied by application of the new constitution' (Act 200 of 1993). 
The approach preferred by Van Dijkhorst J in De Klerk's case (see dicta 
at pl28 - 12 quoted above) does have similarities with the 'mischief 
rule' followed by the court in Hleka's case (supra). 
Despite this, however, Van Dijkhorst J failed to arrive at a con-
clu: sion that is consonant with this approach. A proper application of 
the purposive approach in De Klerk's case would have led the court to a 
different conclusion which conclus ion would have enhanced the values that 
South African society cherishes and wishes to u~hold. 
b) The interpretation of section 241 (8): 
The relevant part of this section provides: 'All proceedings which im-
mediately before the commencement of the Constitution were pending before 
any court of law, including any tribunal or reviewing authority established 
by or under law, exercising jurisdiction in accordance with the law then in 
force, shall tie dealt. with as if this constitution had not been passed ..•• ' 
Until the Constitutional court decision in S v Mhlungu and others 
different provincial divisions of the supreme court have reached 
4 
conflicting decisions as regard the meaning of this section. In decisions 
such as Qozeleni v Minister of law and Order (supra), Shabalala v Attorney 
General, Transvaal and another 1995 (1) SA 608 (T) and Jurgens v The Editor, 
Sunday Times Newspape~ and anothe~ 1995 (2) SA 52 (W) the court concluded 
that section 241 (8) does not preclude the retrospective operation of the 
constitution Act while in cases such as Kalla v The Master (supra} and De 
Klerk's case the words used in section 241 (8) were given their ordinary 
and literal meaning which is that pending proceedings must be dealt with 
as if the Constitution Act had not been passed (my emphasis), i.e., section 
19 
241 (8) precludes the retrospective operation of the Constitution. This 
view was shared by the minority in Mhlungu's case (supra). In the latter 
case the minority (per Kentridge A.J.) held that where the language of a pro-
vision such as section 241 (8) is clear it must be given effect and the 
section should be read as excluding the application of the substantive pro-
visions of the Constitution in pending cases. Kentridge A.J. also relied 
on the common law presumption against retrospective operation of statutes. 
In Kalla's case Van Dijkhorst J. in dealing with section 241 (8) said: 
'We may have a new ball game but the goal is still the same, namely to 
determine the intention of the legislature. It follows that one must start 
with the words used. The rules to be applied in case of ambiguity have 
not evaporated or been abolished. They form part of the law of the land, 
which has not been abrogated by the Constitution' (at p269 C - D). 
I disagree with this statement in that the Constitution Act does indeed 
establish a new legal order. The rules of interpretation to which Van 
Dijkhorst J. refers are those which applied under the past legal order of 
parliamentary supremacy. We now have a system of Constitutional Supremacy. 
The Constitution itself in Section 35 prescribes the rules of interpretation 
which replace the old rules. Consequently the law of the land has changed 
(see C.J. Botha 'Steeds n paar tekstueleikone teen die regstaatlike muur: 
Kalla v The Master 1995 1 SA 261 (T)' 1995 THRHR 523 at p525 - 526). 
The majority decision in Mhlungu's case, which finally settled this matter, 
and the decisions in Qozeleni, Shabalala and Jurgens (supra) were inspired 
by the dictum by Mahomed A.J. (as he then was) in S v Acheson 1991 (2) SA 
805 (NM) at p831 A - C where he said: 'The Constitution of a nation is not 
simply a statute which mechanically defines the structures of government 
and the relations bet-~een the government and the governed. It is a mirror 
reflecting the national soul, the identification of the ideals and aspira-
tions of a nation, the articulation of the values bonding its people and 
disciplining its government. The spirit and tenor of the Constitution 
must therefore preside and permeate the process of judicial interpretation 
and judicial discretion'. (my emphasis). 
In the words of Cloete J in shabalala's case, refering to the above dictum: 
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. . 
'I find it unthink~ble, when regard is had to ··the 
spirit and tenor of the Constitution', that parliament could have intended 
to exclude any person from exercising any of the rightsentrenched in chapter 
3 if he were able to do so when the Constitution came into operation' (at 
p615 F). 
Criticising Kentridge A.J.'s approach' in interpreting section 241 (8) in 
Mhlungu's case, Mahomed J at p873-874 H - A said: ' What these amd many 
other examples would suggest is that the approach favoured by Kentridge A.J 
would remove the protection of fundamental rights from substantial groups 
of people in the country, simply because the proceedings in which the pro-
tection of such rights might be crucial for a person had begun prior to the 
commencement of .the Constitution on 27 April 1994 although the substance 
of the proceedings takes place only after that date. I would be extremely 
distressed to accept that this is what the Constitution intended. It seems 
to negate the very spirit and tenor of the Constitution and its widely ac-
claimed and celebrated objectives. Fundamental to that spirit and tenor 
was the promise of the equal protection of the laws to all people of this 
country and a ringing and decisive break with a past which perpetuated in-
equality and irrational discrimination and arbitrary governmental and exe-
cutive action.' The majority decision rejected what it called the literal 
interpretation of section 241 (8) as this would result in the '···arbitrary 
selection of one category of persons who would become entitled to enjoy the 
human rights guarantees of the constitution and the arbitrary exclusion of 
another group of persons from such entitlement' (at p874 A - B). 
The majority decisioq also held that the presumption against retrospectivity 
only operates where vested rights would be violated and not where (as it is 
the case with the Constitution Act) rights are expanded. This decision 
even though it confirmed the decisions in Shabalala, Qozeleni and Jurgens 
(supra) rejected the approach of the courts in these decisions, e.g., as 
regards the distinction be~~een procedural and substantive rights. 
The decision in De Klerk's case, on the interpretation of section 241 (8), 
is therefore wrong. The approach to interpreting section 241 (8) adopted 
by the court in this case is anachronistic. The court failed to take into 
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consideration the 'spirit and tenor' of the Constitution Act and instead 
resorted to the outdated rules of interpretation. 
c) The Vertical/horizontal operation of Chapter 3 
The reasons (supra) given by the court for holding that Chapter 3 has only 
vertical operation and not also horizontal operation are now considered in 
their above sequence: 
1. That Bills of Rights are traditionally intended to curtail state power 
and not also private power cannot be disputed. The question remains whether 
Chapter 3 provides for the exception, i.e., the regulation of private rela-
tions. 
2. I am of the opinion that the Constitution Act does expressly provide. for 
horizontal operation of Chapter 3 though this is only indirect. The provi-
sions of sections 7(2), 33 (2), 33 (3) and 35 (3) are proof of this. The 
combined effect of these sections is that Chapter 3 applies to both statute 
law, common law and customary law. In terms of section 7 (2) Chapter 3 is 
applicable to all these categories of law in all theirapplications, i.e., 
as well as in instances where they govern private relations. The views 
expressed by Martin Brassey (supra) at p6 are not supported. 
Section 33 (2) subjects the common law, customary law and legislation to the 
provisions of Chapter 3, section 33 (1) (the limitation clause)in .particular. 
Section 33 (3) recognises rights that exist in terms of the common law, 
customary law and legislation to the extent that they do not conflict with 
Chapter 3. 
While section 35 (3) enjoins the courts, when interpreting legislation and 
developing and applying the common law and customary law, to have due regard 
to the spirit, purport and objects of chapter 3. This, as already stated 
above, mandates the courts to infuse into the whole legal system, the values 
enshrined in Chapter 3. The law of defamation (with which the court in De 
Klerk's case was concerned) is a good example of the way in which the see-
page to horizontal relations is to take place (see Van Aswagen, supra). 
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Dicta by Froneman J in Gardener v Whitaker 1995 (2) SA 672 (ECO) are also 
relevant in this regard (see p683 H - I). At p684 E-G he said: !Where 
they (i.e., the common law and customary law) restrict or diminish the 
rights protected in Chapter 3, they cannot survive. The courts are obliged 
to prevent the restriction of those rights if they are directly threatened 
(s7(4)) and to adapt the common law to the broader objects of the consti-
tution even where they are not directly affected (35 (1) and (3))'. At 
p686 A - B he continued to say: 'It follows that in my view, all aspects 
of the common law, including the present state of the law of defamation, 
should, in cases that now come before the courts be scrutinised to decide 
whether they accord with the demands of the constitution. To leave those 
areas of the common law which are in conflict with the constitution un-
affected would in effect, if not by intent, perpertuate aspects'of an unde-
mocratic, discriminatory and unjust past.' 
3) It is incorrect to say that there were no calls for a bill of rights on a 
horizontal plane. It is inconceivable that a nation such as this, which 
suffered so much oppression and discrimination, not only at the hands of 
state bodies but also at the hands private bodies and persons, should not 
demand measures to eradicate what had become known as 'privatised apartheid' 
(see LM Du Plessis 'Enkele gedagtes oor die historiese interpretasie van 
Hoofstuk 3 van die Oorgangsgrondwet: De Klerk v Duplessis' 1995 THRHR 
504 at p508 - 509) and Gardener v Whitaker supra at p685 C - E). 
4. It is trite that the Common Law is or was the foundation of a just legal 
system. But the inroads made into this system by Apartheid inspired legis-
lation and the publ~c policy it established contaminated this system of law 
and resulted in the emasculation of the judiciary. An example of this is 
the law of defamation (see SAUK v 0' Malley, Pakendon v De Fleming, Neethling 
v Du Preez, Neethling v Weekly Mail supra) and administrative law. In the 
latter the audi alteram partem principle was no longer presumed, parliament 
could take away this right expressly or by necessary implication and courts 
were powerless to prevent this. 
It is true that the removal of all these authoritarian encroachmentswill 
lead to their resuscitation. This the cmnstitution Act does by giving 
the courts 
23 
the powers in terms of section 35 (1) and 35 (3). 
5. This again is incorrect for the reasons given in (2) above. The legislature 
does have the duty in terms of the new Constitution to effect these correc-
tions, e.g., in terms of section 7 (1) as it is bound by the provisione of 
Chapter 3. However, it is not the only body mandated to make these correc-
tions. The courts are also mandated to undertake the task of resuscitating 
and correcting theexisting law in terms of section 35 (3). 
6. In terms of sections 7(2), 33 (2), 33 (3) and 35 (3) the whole body of the 
common law is expressly subjected to Chapter 3. The legislature has there-
fore 'said so expressly'. I disagree that there will be (or there is) legal 
uncertainty if the whole body of the common law is subjected to Chapter 3 
as it has been done in terms of the above sections. The Constitution Act 
· per se introduces a new legal order in South Africa. Sections 
33 (2) and 33 (3) state what the law is and what is no longer the law. 
Section 4 (1) states that the constitution Act is the supreme law of the land. 
There is in my opinion, certainty as to what the law is. Legislation, the 
common law and customary law, wherever they conflict with the constitution, no 
longer constitute the law of this land. This new legal order is the product 
of democratic participation by all South Africans. There can be no uncert-
ainty in the law at least not to an extent that will justify the retention 
• 
of sectionsof the existing law that are unjust (see (Garde ner v Whitaker 
p686B supra) . 
7. The presence of section 33 (4), which is aimed at enabling the legislature 
to enact measures designed to prohibit unfair discrimination by private 
. 
bodies and persons, does not in my opinion preclude the indirect horizontal 
operation of Chapter 3. While section 33 (4) provides for regulative 
measures aimed directly at the acts of private bodies and individuals, 
section 35 (3) provides for judicial action or measures that indirectly 
affect the acts of individuals and bodies but directly affect the law 
in terms of which these acts are governed. Chapter 3 does not directly 
bind private bodies and persons it, however, binds them indirectly by 
directly being applicable to the law in terms of which individuals con-
duct their relations (see Garde. ·ner v Whitaker, supra at p685 E - F) • 
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8. The object of section 35 (3) is not to make Chapter 3 applicable to the 
actions or conduct of individuals inter se, it is to infuse into legislation. J 
the common law and customary law where they govern private relations, 
the spirit of Chapter 3 to ensure that this filters through all fields 
of activity among individuals. The aim is to create an open and democratic 
society based on freedom and equality. If the result of this infusion 
(of the spirit of Chapter 3 into the common law) be the unset~lement 
of this system, then this is what the supreme law authorises and It has 
to be done to adapt this system to the new legal order in terms of 
sections 33 (2), 33 (3) and 35 (3). 
9. The court in Mandela v Falati (supra) in m~ opinion failed to consider 
the provisions of section 35 (3). The rights in Chapter 3 do not have 
direct horizontal application. However, section 35 (3) introduces indirect 
horizontal application of these rights. 
10. sections 33 (2) and 33 (3) do not, it is accepted, provide for the scope 
of the rights to which they refer. This is because it s not necessary, 
when regard is had to the context of these sections. These sections 
are marely aimed at subjecting the existing law, i.e., its content, 
to Chapter 3 and the Constitution. 
section 35 (3) also does not need to refer to the scope of rights. It 
is concerned with the manner in which legislation, the common law and 
customary law are to be interpreted, applied and developed, respectively. 
11. section 33 (4) has a specific purpos~. as discussed above, which has no 
effect on the horizontality or not of Chapter 3' the same applies to 
section 33 ( 5) • 
The court in oe Klerk's case favoured the retention of the common law as 
it exists (see e.g., pl26 C-D and pl32 C-E), while on the other hand 
its interpretation of the meaning and object of section 35 (3) dictated 
the contrary. At pl 3 E-F the court, with regard to section 35(3) said~ 
· " • t · d" · 1 ppr~ach· ~~ _i~.-~PrDYP~ation 
'Section 35(3) is int~n~e~ to permea e our JU icia a-~~ ~~ -- ---
of statutes and the development of the c~mmon law with the fr~qr~nce of the 
values in which the constitution is anchored. This me 4 ns that w£1enever there 
is ro~m f~r interpretation or development of our virile system of law that 
is to be the point of departure'. 
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Propagating a retention of the law of defamation as it exists and at the same 
. 
. ,~ 
time giving this meaning to section 35 (3) isAmy opinion, with respect, a 
contradiction. Section 35 (3) enjoi~ed the court in this case, to infuse the 
application and development of the common law of defamation with 'the fragrance 
of the valuesin which the constitution is anchored 'and this the court has 
failed to do. The constitution is anchored inter alia, in the values of 
democracy, and democracy demands, for it to thrive, full recognition of the 
right to freedom of speech, expression and freedom of the press and other 
media provided for in terms of section 15. The court refused to apply the 
provisions of section 35 (3) to the law of defamation notwithstanding the fact 
that it was obliged to (see dicta in Gardener's case at p684{·Stln<tp686 A - B and 
Van Aswagen, supra). 
The decision is De Klerk's case, with respect, is wrong and should be discarded, 
while that of Frone;man Jin Gardener v Whitaker (supra), which also dealt with 
the law of defamation and Chapter 3, should be supported for the court in the 
Gardener case correctly applied the provisions of section 35 (3) to the law of 
defamation and as a result it was able to expose the latter's inconsistencies 
with the constitution and Chapter 3. 
Conclusion 
As it turned out the literal approach adopted by the court in interpreting sec-
tion 241 (8) denied individuals their rights in terms of the Constitution. Only 
a purposive or teleological approach, which the court itself propagatec.((see pl28 
f,,aua. 
G), would led to a different conclusion. 
A 
The unsatisfactory manner in which the court dealt with section 35 (3) also re-
flects'badly on this judgement. The result here again was that individuals 
were denied their rights in terms of section 15. It would appear that in this 
case the court could not make the 'leap' from (operating in) a system of par-
liamentary supremacy to (operating in) the present one of Constitutional Supre-
macy. South Africa's nascent Constitutional jurisprudence does not need this 
decision. 
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